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BEACONS: A VIABLE SOLUTION TO THE EVEREVOLVING PROBLEM OF CORPORATE DATA
BREACHES
Lauren Fiotakis*
ABSTRACT—In an increasingly virtual world, data breaches
continuously plague large corporations. These companies have few options
to keep their data out of the hands of persistent hackers, who often discover
ways around any safeguards that may be in place. It seems as though any
measures companies are currently able to employ merely delay the inevitable
breach that will bring with it the potential loss of both customers’ data and
their faith in the privacy and security of their information. These attacks can
be debilitating to corporations; thus, it seems only fair to provide them the
ability to take active measures to defend against cybercriminals.
Some have argued that allowing hacking victims to retaliate against
their attackers could help reduce cybercrime. Others suggest that these
counterstrikes may lead to an increased prevalence of attacks rather than
deter initial attackers. This note will argue that the use of beacons—code
hidden in a company’s files that alerts the company of the files’ theft—
should be permitted as an effective and proportional cyber-self-defense
measure.
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INTRODUCTION
In an increasingly virtual world, data breaches continuously plague
large corporations. These companies have few options to keep their data out
of the hands of persistent hackers, who often discover ways around any
safeguards that may be in place. It seems as though any measures companies
are able to employ merely delay the inevitable breach that will bring with it
the potential loss of both customers’ data and their faith in the privacy and
security of their information in the hands of the hacked institution.
The scale of this issue is only increasing; as of 2014, cybercrime cost
the global economy more than $400 billion annually, with the United States’
annual cost accounting for $100 billion of that figure. 1 To combat this,
worldwide spending on information security products topped $70 billion in
the same year.2 However, these measures have not been as effective as their
price tag may suggest. In 2013, Target suffered a significant security breach
where customer payment records were stolen,3 affecting as many as one in
three Americans.4 The well-publicized 2017 Equifax scandal, which saw the
compromise of 143 million Americans’ personal information, 5 cost the
company’s insurers alone at least $125 million.6 According to the National
Bureau of Economic Research, a company loses 1.1% of market
capitalization and experiences a 3.2% drop in annual sales growth following
a breach of customer data.7 These attacks can be debilitating to corporations;
thus, it seems only fair to provide them the ability to take active measures to
defend against cybercriminals.
Some have argued that allowing hacking victims to retaliate against
their attackers could help reduce such attacks. 8 Others suggest that these
counterstrikes may lead to an increased prevalence of attacks rather than
deterring initial attackers.9 As it stands, federal cyber law does not permit

1
Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Bugs in the Market: Creating a Legitimate, Transparent, and
Vendor-Focused Market for Software Vulnerabilities, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 755 (2016).
2
Id. at 756.
3
Id. at 763.
4
Id.
5
Seena Gressin, The Equifax Data Breach: What to Do, BLAKELY WATERS (Sept. 13, 2017),
https://www.blakelywalters.com/blog/the-equifax-data-breach-what-to-do
[https://perma.cc/P97CEAYQ]. Hackers accessed Equifax’s network from May through July, stealing names, Social Security
numbers, birth dates, addresses, some customers’ driver’s license numbers, and other personal data. See
id.
6
Scott J. Shackelford et al., Rethinking Active Defense: A Comparative Analysis of Proactive
Cybersecurity Policymaking, 41 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 377, 384 (2019).
7
Id.
8
Orin S. Kerr, Computer Crime Law 143 (4th ed. 2018).
9
Id.

290

19:289 (2022)

A Viable Solution to Corporate Data Breaches

any unauthorized access of a network, 10 meaning these active defensive
measures would not be permitted even if they were proportional to the initial
attack—the usual standard for self-defense.
This note will argue that the use of beacons—code hidden in a
company’s files that alerts the company of the files’ theft—should be
permitted as a cyber-self-defense measure. Part I will examine the various
dialogue around self-help in cyberspace, Part II will explore the relevant
statute, Part III will discuss the need for proportionality in any response to
crime, Part IV will illustrate different possible methods of cyber-selfdefense, and Part V will present beacons as the most effective and
proportional cyber defense mechanism given all other factors.
I.

SELF-HELP IN CYBERSPACE

While the notion of self-help in cyberspace has never been litigated in
federal court,11 it has long been a topic of discussion among scholars. There
are many arguments for and against its use; active defense and self-help
tactics have the potential to aid companies who have been hacked but may
also cause additional damage. While all forms of active defense carry with
them some degree of risk, the benefits of proportional active defense
measures likely outweigh the costs.12
Scholars in favor of active defense argue that there should be some
acceptance of self-defense for cybercrimes, as it is a well-defined principle
for other non-cybercrimes.13 They argue that the threat of a counterattack
could disincentivize potential hackers from committing these crimes, as
perpetrators would come to expect some form of retaliation.14 This would
allow corporations to take a counteroffensive role in the protection of
consumer data, rather than simply setting up firewalls in the hope that they
will be sufficient to stop the ever-evolving hackers.15
One of the primary arguments in favor of cyber-self-defense is that
there are many challenges in charging and prosecuting cybercriminals. First,

10

Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
KERR, supra note 8, at 141.
12
See Michael Edmund O’Neill, Old Crimes in New Bottles: Sanctioning Cybercrime, 9 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 237, 265 (2000).
13
See id.; Bruce P. Smith, Hacking, Poaching, and Counterattacking: Digital Counterstrikes and
the Contours of Self-Help, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 171 (2005); see also discussion infra Part III.
14
See O’Neill, supra note 12, at 279.
15
See discussion infra Part IV.
11

291

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

hacking victims are often unwilling to come forward.16 Reporting a breach
to the authorities would necessitate revealing the breach to the public, 17
which often leads to bad publicity and a loss of consumer confidence.
Additionally, law enforcement officers often struggle to determine the origin
of a malicious code.18 Sophisticated hackers take effort to cover their tracks
by routing their attacks through many servers in myriad locations, increasing
the difficulty of following an attacker’s trail.19 These servers may be located
in different countries, and the lack of international cyber law combined with
the difficulty of coordinating law enforcement efforts across borders reduces
the chance that a hacker will ever be held accountable for the harm caused.20
Additionally, many nations lack comprehensive cybercrime statutes and
could potentially become safe havens for criminals.21
Computers have provided criminals with a tool that allows them to
realize increased returns from their crimes. What used to take a team of inperson perpetrators and a complex plan can now be achieved by one offender
writing a code far from the scene of the crime. The distance afforded by
computer use also lowers the potential costs for these offenders, as they have
a lower probability of detection and, therefore, conviction. To deter
cybercrime, the government must raise the costs of these crimes, something
it may not be well-positioned to accomplish. 22 Raising these costs could
come through sentencing enhancements or by allowing for self-help by the
victims of hacks. 23 While sentencing enhancements may be temporarily
effective, they soon reach a point of diminishing marginal returns. 24 The
government cannot increase sentences infinitely; they would soon become
absurd when compared to sentences for non-computer-based crimes. 25
Additionally, the sentence would be long regardless of the severity of the
crime. 26 This could actually increase the prevalence of more severe
16
Smith, supra note 13, at 172–73. Many corporations worry that “negative publicity would hurt
their organization’s stock and/or image” and are concerned that competitors would take advantage of any
information relayed to law enforcement. Id.
17
Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 17, 2022),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breachnotification-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/XCF4-WY4Z]. Each state has different requirements for what
constitutes a breach of personal information and who must be notified of such a breach. Id.
18
Smith, supra note 13, at 173–74.
19
Id. at 174.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
O’Neill, supra note 12, at 265.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 274.
25
See id.
26
Id.
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cybercrimes, as criminals would have little reason to stop their illegal
activities before causing significant damage. 27 The government’s other
option would be to create some allowance for cyber victims to deter
criminals through self-defense. Rather than waiting for a trial and conviction,
a victim could deliver a swift punishment immediately following a crime.28
The counterargument is that due to the difficulty in determining who
exactly may have hacked a system, these hacking victims may
consequentially launch an attack against an innocent third party.29 That party
then, having been attacked, would be within its rights to retaliate against the
initial victim.30 This has the potential to greatly increase unauthorized access
and computer damage as a whole, effectively accomplishing what self-help
techniques were meant to prevent. 31 Additionally, there is significant
potential for collateral damage, as hackers often overtake others’ computers
and networks to launch attacks.32 This both helps hackers to disguise their
identities and could induce counterstrikes on these intermediary, or
‘zombie,’ computers.33 Further, active defense has the potential to hinder law
enforcement in its cyber investigations. A counterstrike or the reclaiming of
stolen data could destroy evidence or compromise ongoing investigations,
impeding authorities’ ability to stop these already elusive criminals.34
Those in favor of active defense have relied on the doctrine of necessity
to excuse the fact that the defender would have to access the attacker’s
network, or possibly that of a zombie.35 Even if this doctrine were accepted
in court, however, it could still expose defenders to significant civil
liability.36 Any harm caused while accessing someone else’s computer or
network would be recoverable as damages against the defender, consistent
with typical treatment under the doctrine of necessity.37 This may reduce the
attractiveness of active defense, as any potential benefits achieved from the
recovery of data could be offset by a significant damage award owed to the
hackers or zombies.

27

Id.
Id. at 279.
29
KERR, supra note 8, at 143.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Smith, supra note 13, at 180.
33
Id.
34
C. Alden Pelker, Permission to Come Aboard (an Adversary’s Network)? Ensuring Legality of
Enhanced Network Security Measures Through a Multilayer Permission Acquisition Scheme, 53 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 437, 443 (2016).
35
Smith, supra note 13, at 192; see discussion infra Part III b.
36
Smith, supra note 13, at 192–93.
37
Id.
28

293

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

Given the arguments for and against active defense, it is clear that an
all-or-nothing approach to this issue would be less effective than a method
that integrates these opposing concerns. While any type of active defense
presents some risk, a complete prohibition of self-help in cyberspace is
inevitably accompanied by a general lack of enforcement of cyber laws. An
active defense method that is not meant to cause any damage could still
accomplish the desired effects but may also avoid the negative repercussions
associated with overly aggressive measures.
II. EXAMINATION OF THE CYBER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT
Any type of active cyber defense measure would be governed by
relevant unauthorized access statutes, as any activity that takes place outside
of the defender’s own network constitutes access to another network.38 The
federal government, as well as every state, has adopted an unauthorized
access statute.39 The primary federal statute governing unauthorized access
to a computer or network is 18 U.S.C. § 1030, the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act (“CFAA”). 40 The CFAA prohibits any kind of unauthorized
access and there are no exclusions from this statute. 41 Therefore, even
proportional self-defense measures are unavailable to victims of cyberattacks.
One of the CFAA’s most frequently utilized subsections is
§ 1030(a)(2), which prohibits “intentionally access[ing] a computer without
authorization or exceed[ing] authorized access” of that computer to obtain
information.42 The section is limited to accessing the records of financial
institutions, United States government agencies or departments, or protected
computers. 43 While this appears to be narrow, a “protected computer” is
defined under the statute as “a computer . . . which is used in or affecting
interstate or foreign commerce or communication . . . ,” 44 covering
effectively every computer with a network connection.
The CFAA does not define “access”; however, many states’
unauthorized access statutes are similar to the federal statute, and therefore
may be helpful in interpreting the CFAA. The State of California defines
access as “to gain entry to, instruct, cause input to, cause output from, cause
data processing with, or communicate with . . . a computer, computer
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
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KERR, supra note 8, at 30.
§ 1030.
Id.
§ 1030(a)(2).
Id.
§ 1030(e)(2).
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system, or computer network.”45 Under this definition, any time a hacker
enters a network he does not own or is not authorized to enter, his actions
would fall under the statute. 46 The phrase “exceeds authorized access” is
defined by the CFAA and is described as “access[ing] a computer with
authorization and . . . us[ing] such access to obtain or alter information in the
computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter.”47 In United
States v. Nosal, the Ninth Circuit concluded that this provision relates to
people with some limited authorization to access the network at issue,48 who
would be in violation if they accessed files or data that were beyond the scope
of their authorization. 49 The purpose of the access is irrelevant; all that
matters is whether the hacker was authorized to access the files in the first
place.50
Additionally, § 1030(a)(5)(A) prohibits “intentionally caus[ing]
damage without authorization, to a protected computer.”51 A hacker can only
be charged under this subsection when the damage was caused intentionally;
intentional unauthorized access is not sufficient here, as “without
authorization” refers to the specific acts that caused the damage.52 Additional
subsections of § 1030(a)(5) only require intentional unauthorized access and
have lower mens rea requirements for the act of causing the damage.53
Along with the CFAA’s criminal components, § 1030(g) provides for
civil relief from any “damage or loss by reason of a violation of this
section. . . .” 54 This allows victims to receive some compensation for the
extensive costs that come with being the target of a hack; however, this is
not always practical, as law enforcement would have to identify and locate
the hacker before a suit could be brought. While this section attempts to
provide needed relief for hacking victims, it often falls short, seeing as
hackers are notoriously difficult to track down.55
These provisions, along with the rest of the CFAA, create a framework
in which there is no opportunity for reasonable exclusion from culpability;
you have either accessed a computer in an unauthorized fashion or you have

45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

State v. Riley, 846 P.2d 1365, 1373 (Wash. 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(b)(1) (2020).
Riley, 846 P.2d at 1373.
§ 1030(e)(6).
676 F.3d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 2012).
Id.
Id. at 858.
§ 1030(a)(5)(A).
United States v. Thomas, 877 F.3d 591, 595 (5th Cir. 2017).
§ 1030(a)(5)(B)–(C).
§ 1030(g).
See Smith, supra note 13, at 173–74; O’Neill, supra note 12, at 275.
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not. While the statute provides provisions for sentencing enhancements,56
there is no allowance for any type of self-defense, a divergence from the
manner in which cybercrimes typically mirror more traditional crimes.57 This
makes the statute seem disproportionately harsh and skewed toward
punishment, especially when compared with traditional crime statutes that
include mitigating factors and affirmative defenses.
III. PROPORTIONALITY IN CYBER SELF-DEFENSE
Proponents for and against active defense measures often neglect the
concept of proportionality. The most effective solution, however, is neither
as drastic as those supporting active defense may suggest nor as restrictive
as the current state of the CFAA mandates. Instead, active defense measures
should be allowed only if they are proportional to the initial attack, as is
commonly accepted in other criminal and tort settings. 58 If using this
common standard, a violation under § 1030(a)(2), for example, could only
be matched by a victim accessing the attacker’s computer in an unauthorized
manner to obtain specific and relevant information.
The concept of proportionality in self-defense is present in state
criminal statutes and common law tort doctrine, evidencing its pervasiveness
in the justice system. 59 Additionally, Congress recently proposed an
amendment to the CFAA that would allow for proportional self-defense,
further illustrating the importance of thoughtful and restrained
countermeasures rather than aggressive and retaliatory strikes.60
A. Criminal Offenses
Self-defense is a commonly referred to doctrine used to justify criminal
offenses. For the most part, criminal statutes and their associated self-defense
provisions are written as state law, and therefore it can be difficult to gain a
perspective that would be equivalent to the federal prohibition of active
defense. The Model Penal Code, which has greatly influenced criminal law
across the country, can be used as a proxy for nationwide criminal law.
Model Penal Code § 3.04 outlines the provisions relating to the use of force
in self-defense, stating generally that “the use of force upon or toward
another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is
56

See § 1030(c).
See KERR, supra note 8, at 15–16 (explaining how unauthorized access statutes were built upon
criminal theft statutes).
58
See discussion infra Part III a–b.
59
See discussion infra Part III a–b.
60
See Active Cyber Defense Certainty Act, H.R. 3270, 116th Cong. (2019); see also discussion infra
Part III c.
57
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immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use
of unlawful force by such other person. . . .”61 While proportionality is not
explicitly mentioned, it can be inferred through the “immediately necessary”
language, which implies that a defender is not authorized to use more force
than would be sufficient to stop the attack.
Perhaps more applicable, the Model Penal Code also has a section
detailing the circumstances under which force can be used to protect
property.62 Under § 3.06, force is justified when the defender believes that it
is “immediately necessary . . . to prevent or terminate an unlawful entry
or . . . a trespass against or the unlawful carrying away of tangible, movable
property . . . in his possession. . . .” 63 While not an exact fit—due to the
requirement that the property be tangible and moveable—this section could
lay the framework for an equivalent section dealing with the protection of
intangible and virtual data using reasonably necessary force.
Section 3.06 also creates an allowance for the use of a device to protect
property, as long as the device is not meant to cause death or serious bodily
injury, the use of the device is reasonable under the circumstances, and the
device is one customarily used for such purpose or notice is given that the
device will be used.64 Using a computer as an active defense device would
meet the requirements of this section. No active defense measure is likely to
present a risk of death or bodily harm and therefore the first element would
be met. Second, the use of the device is typically reasonable under the
circumstances because it is logical for the defender to move beyond purely
passive defenses once they have been bypassed and proven unsuccessful.
Finally, active defense techniques meet the third element; whether employed
by defenders or law enforcement, computers with specialized code are
typically the tools used to locate attackers and reclaim stolen data.
Alternatively, this element could be satisfied through a warning, putting
intruders on notice that their network may subsequently be accessed to
retrieve any stolen files or obtain attributional information.65
The Supreme Court has also acknowledged the proportionality
requirement for acts of self-defense, despite the fact that such cases rarely
make it to the highest court. In 1893, the Court stated:
A man who is in the lawful pursuit of his business . . . and when in that condition
he is attacked by another, under circumstances which denote an intention to take
away his life or to do him some enormous bodily harm, he may lawfully kill the
61
62
63
64
65

MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(a) (AM. L. INST. 1985).
Id. § 3.06.
Id. § 3.06(1)(a).
Id. § 3.06(5).
See discussion infra Part V.
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assailant. . . . The law of self-defense is a law of proportions as well as a law of
necessity, and it is only danger that is deadly in its character that you can
exercise a deadly act against.66

The criminal justice system is generally willing to recognize selfdefense as a justification for committing a criminal act, but only if it was
necessary under the circumstances and not more serious than the attack
against which it was meant to defend. This principle must be taken into
account when considering active defense in cyberspace; an extreme or
retaliatory attack that is not meant to protect the network or reclaim stolen
data will almost certainly be judged disproportionate, even if a court or
legislature allowed for self-help in cyberspace.
B. Tort Principles
Self-defense is also seen in common law tort cases. The Restatement
(Second) of Torts gives guidance that illustrates many instances where selfdefense may be permitted, but only to the extent that it is reasonably
necessary and proportional to the initial action. The Restatement first states
that a defender may act in a manner that is not likely to cause death or serious
bodily harm in effort to “prevent or terminate another’s intrusion upon the
actor’s land or chattels. . . .” 67 Many proponents for active defense often
equate computer crimes to trespass to chattels, 68 meaning that the
Restatement illustrates a path for defenders to claim self-defense when using
active defense measures. Death or serious bodily harm could be equated to
disabling an attacker’s network or destroying data, so it follows that any
reasonable force less than that which would cause serious harm to the
attacker’s computer would be allowed. The Restatement also emphasizes
proportionality in a section detailing the “[a]mount of [f]orce
[p]ermissible.” 69 It states that force “in excess of that which the actor
correctly or reasonably believes to be necessary to prevent or terminate the
other’s intrusion” is prohibited.70
Additionally, the Restatement contemplates the use of a device to carry
out self-defense measures, provided that the device does not threaten death
or serious bodily harm.71 Section 84 states that a defender can use a device
to protect his chattels if

66
67
68
69
70
71
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Allen v. United States, 150 U.S. 551, 556–57 (1893) (internal quotations omitted).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 77 (AM. L. INST. 1965).
Smith, supra note 13, at 189.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 81 (AM. L. INST. 1965).
Id.
Id. § 84.
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(a) the use of such a device is reasonably necessary to protect the . . . chattels
from intrusion, and (b) the use of the particular device is reasonable under the
circumstances, and (c) the device is one customarily used for such a purpose, or
reasonable care is taken to make its use known to probable intruders.72

Similar to the analysis under MPC § 3.06,73 this section could apply to
active defense, with the defender’s computer labeled as the device.
Many advocates for active defense in cyberspace cite the doctrine of
necessity as justification for entering a network without authorization. 74
According to the Restatement, “[o]ne is privileged to enter . . . land in the
possession of another if it is or reasonably appears to be necessary to prevent
serious harm to . . . the actor, or his land or chattels. . . .”75 Relying on this
doctrine, and still assuming that data can be characterized as chattels, a
defender would be able to access an attacker’s network without authorization
if such access were to reasonably appear necessary to stop an ongoing, or
prevent a future, attack. A proportionality requirement can be inferred by the
fact that only necessary actions are permitted.
Finally, some courts have recognized a privilege to enter someone
else’s land to reclaim stolen property.76 This privilege is articulated in § 198
of the Restatement and, again, implies that proportionality is required. 77
Section 198 states that “[o]ne is privileged to enter land in the possession of
another, at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner, for the purpose of
removing a chattel to the immediate possession of which the actor is
entitled. . . .” 78 This section would also support the use of active cyber
defense measures intended to reclaim stolen data.
C. Proposed Amendment to the CFAA
As noted above, the CFAA does not allow for any self-defense
measures in cyberspace and so any active defense practices would almost
certainly violate the statute. Former NSA General Counsel Stewart Baker,
however, argued that if a thief steals data, the rightful owner should be given
implied authorization to retrieve the stolen material, even if that involves
accessing the thief’s network.79 While not a perfect analogy, the old English

72

Id.
See discussion supra Part III a.
74
Pelker, supra note 34, at 438; Smith, supra note 13, at 192.
75
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197 (AM. L. INST. 1965).
76
KERR, supra note 8, at 141.
77
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 198 (AM. L. INST. 1965).
78
Id.
79
Brian Corcoran, A Comparative Study of Domestic Laws Constraining Private Sector Active
Defense Measures in Cyberspace, 11 HARV. NAT’L. SEC. J. 1, 14 (2020).
73
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‘finders keepers’ doctrine in property law states that someone who finds
property has rights in that property against everyone except for the rightful
owner; while others should be prohibited from further stealing the data, the
thief cannot claim rights in the data superior to those of the rightful owner.80
It seems counterintuitive that a company would be aware of a data breach
and yet unable to reclaim its data due to the very law that prohibited the
breach in the first place.
To address this incongruency, Congress recently proposed the Active
Cyber Defense Certainty Act, an amendment to the CFAA effectively
legalizing proportional self-defense in cyberspace. 81 In drafting the
amendment, Congress acknowledged cybercrime’s growing threat to
national security and the associated economic implications. 82 It also
referenced the difficulty of prosecuting cybercriminals and the resulting lack
of deterrence.83 Under the proposed amendment, a victim of “a persistent
unauthorized intrusion of the individual entity’s computer” could launch a
counterattack against the alleged hacker.84 The amendment provides for both
an exclusion from the prohibitions under § 1030 and an affirmative defense.85
The proposed § 1030(k) creates an exception from the rest of § 1030
for the “use of attributional technology,” such as beacons, which “return[]
locational or attributional data in response to a cyber intrusion in order to
identify the source of an intrusion.” 86 This exception only applies if the
defensive technology does not cause any destruction of data, impair the
functionality of the attacker’s computer, or make it easier for others to hack
the attacker’s network.87
In addition to excepting certain acts from § 1030, the amendment
proposes § 1030(l), which creates an affirmative defense that may be used
by a defender who has taken active defense measures against an attacker.88
The amendment defines active cyber defense measures as “any measure . . .
undertaken by, or at the direction of, a defender . . . consisting of accessing
without authorization the computer of the attacker to the defender’s own
network to gather information in order to” perform a variety of objectives.89
Under this provision, a defender could utilize the affirmative defense if its
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
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Armory v. Delamirie (1721) 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B.).
Active Cyber Defense Certainty Act, H.R. 3270, 116th Cong. (2019).
Id. § 2.
Id.
Id. § 4.
Id. §§ 3–4.
Id. § 3.
Id.
Id. § 4.
Id.

19:289 (2022)

A Viable Solution to Corporate Data Breaches

unauthorized access of the attacker’s computer was to determine the
attacker’s identity, disrupt a continued attack, or monitor an attacker’s
behavior to prevent future attacks. 90 The proposed amendment does,
however, contain carveouts excluding activity that intentionally destroys
information on the attacker’s computer not belonging to the victim or
recklessly causes any physical or financial harm, along with other overly
disruptive behavior, and thereby eliminates the availability of retaliatory
strikes and other disproportional measures.91
The proposed amendment does not give defenders carte blanche to
launch attacks against attackers, even if they do comply with the carveouts
in § 1030(l), as defenders must also give adequate notice to the FBI.92 This
requirement mitigates some of the issues with active defense posed above,
such as the attacking of intermediary zombie computers and the possible
destruction of evidence necessary to charge the initial attacker.93
Finally, the amendment would only provide an exclusion from criminal
liability; it does not excuse any civil liability that may arise under § 1030(g)
due to defensive measures. 94 This further discourages overzealous
counterstrikes, as intermediaries unintentionally targeted in an active defense
operation could still claim compensatory damages or injunctive relief. 95
Further, the primary issue with § 1030(g)—the fact that perpetrators are
difficult to locate—would be alleviated because the defender would have
given notice to the FBI of its planned activities, thereby creating a clear trail
back to it if something were to go awry.
Overall, the proposed Active Cyber Defense Certainty Act would
transform the CFAA for the better—from a statute with little flexibility and
no room for self-defense into one that more closely mirrors traditional crime
statutes. The amendment would allow the benefits of proportional active
defense to be captured, while also reducing the very real risk of unmitigated
collateral damage to intermediary networks. The availability of civil
remedies and the FBI notice requirement ensure that any resulting damage is
duly rectified and overly aggressive active defense tactics would still not be
available to defenders, further assuring those arguing against active defense
that their fears about escalation and increased damage would not materialize.
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IV. CYBER SELF-DEFENSE ALTERNATIVES
Although most scholars focus on the extreme example of causing
destruction through retaliation,96 there is a spectrum of cyber-self-defense
measures that ranges from passive to aggressive.97 Discussed in this Part are
cyber hygiene measures, honeypots, sinkholes, beacons, and, at the
aggressive end of the spectrum, hacking back. Some of the more passive
measures may not be sufficient to repel an attack, while more aggressive
measures would never be deemed proportional to the attack from which they
would stem.
The most aggressive and well-known form of cyber-self-defense is
hacking back. The goal of this retaliatory hacking could be to recover stolen
data, to temporarily disrupt the adversary’s network, or to damage the
adversary’s assets.98 In 2012, one in every three attendees at Black Hat USA,
a cybersecurity conference, reported that they had engaged in retaliatory
hacking at least once, with 13% doing so frequently.99 While this figure may
not be perfectly representative of the actions of the broader corporate
community,100 it does illustrate that aggressive measures are not universally
opposed and, accordingly, deserve to be analyzed. Conversely, many
corporate executives and the Department of Justice have said that they do
not support hacking back, as they believe the risks outweigh the benefits in
many cases.101 This further emphasizes the importance of proportionality in
an analysis of active defense measures; defenders should only be permitted
to carry out initiatives that remain effective while carrying little risk of
collateral damage.
At the other end of the spectrum, the most passive forms of self-defense
in cyberspace are labeled as cyber hygiene. These are measures taken within
the defender’s own network to deter and block hackers, such as the use of
firewalls. These can work to prevent hackers from accessing the network but
lose effectiveness once they are bypassed. Firewalls do not come into
conflict with any cyber laws, as they do not involve accessing any networks
other than that which they are meant to protect.102
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Honeypots are a more aggressive defensive measure, but still take place
within the defender’s own network. A defender can create fake files, file
structures, or servers that appear to be real but are segmented from the rest
of the defender’s data.103 Similar to Winnie the Pooh getting caught in a pot
of honey, these files attract and isolate intruders so they are easily
identifiable.104 This tactic does not run afoul of statutes prohibiting access to
other networks but could be considered a trap and trace device under the Pen
Register/Trap and Trace statute.105 While the Department of Justice has made
no official statement determining whether honeypots should be considered
trap and trace devices,106 the fact that honeypots could allow companies to
identify the source of hackers’ electronic communications indicates that they
would likely be included under this statute. If so, they could not be legally
used absent a court order.107
Similar to honeypots, sinkholes redirect traffic as a domain name is
translated to its corresponding IP address by replacing the target IP address
with a sinkhole IP address.108 This allows defenders to watch as potentially
malicious traffic enters their local networks.109 Sinkholes operate to capture
incoming data and identify the source of an attack, and therefore may also
be considered trap and trace devices. 110 Moreover, sinkholes require
coordination with Internet Service Providers or Domain Name System
registrars to operate, and these entities have little incentive to assist, even if
the activity is deemed legal.111
Beacons are more aggressive than honeypots and sinkholes, as they do
involve accessing the attacker’s network, but still do not aim to cause
damage. Further outlined in Part V, beacons can notify a defender when files
are removed from its server and alert the defender as to the files’ new
location.112 Because the beacons do access the attacker’s network, however,
they can violate statutes prohibiting unauthorized access.
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V. BEACONS AS A PROPORTIONAL RESPONSE
To accomplish proportionality in cyber defense responses, companies
should incorporate beacons into their most critical files as a part of their
cybersecurity regimen. Beacons are small pieces of code embedded in files
likely to be stolen that notify the owner when the files are removed from the
owner’s network.113 They are also capable of sending information back to the
files’ owner, such as the thief’s location and IP address.114 Beacons are a tool
commonly used for legitimate purposes by mainstream commercial websites
to track activity and traffic. 115 Small, transparent images can be added to
websites or emails, unbeknownst to the viewer.116 When the page is accessed,
the image reaches back out to the server on which it is hosted to load.117 This
communication can include information about the system on which the
beacon now sits, helping the owner to learn about those accessing the
website.118 This innocuous technique can become a powerful defense tool
when used to track cyber thieves.
Similar to the protection offered by a car alarm, embedding an alert into
a computer’s files that notifies the owner when they have been stolen would
add another layer of protection for important data, as it would be easy to
identify a breach. Further, similar to a stolen car’s GPS tracker, the beacon
could alert the victim as to where the data has been taken. This would
alleviate any issues in determining who exactly perpetrated the attack. The
company could then notify the relevant authorities, who could stop any
persistent attacks and charge the hackers involved.
As shown above, an important consideration when dealing with selfdefense is proportionality. The Model Penal Code dictates that force should
only be used when it is reasonably necessary to protect either oneself or one’s
property from assailants or to reclaim stolen property 119 —requirements
which beacons satisfy.120 Causing no actual damage, beacons use precisely
the amount of force that would be needed for a defender to determine the
location of an attacker, allowing the defender to prevent further trespass
against his property by notifying the relevant authorities of the attacker’s
information.
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Further, both the Model Penal Code and the Restatement (Second) of
Torts allow for self-defense using a device; both employ similar elements to
determine if the device’s use is proper.121 A beacon is a useful tool because
it satisfies Model Penal Code and Restatement elements.122 First, a beacon is
not meant to cause death or serious bodily harm—it is not intended to cause
any damage whatsoever. Next, its use would be reasonable given the
circumstances, as it is an effective way for defenders to discover that their
data has been stolen and to determine its new whereabouts. Given the
difficulty associated with finding and prosecuting hackers, this appears to be
one of few viable options defenders may have to locate and eventually
reclaim their stolen data. Finally, given that beacons’ use as a self-defense
tool currently violates the CFAA, the clearer method to satisfy the
documents’ third element would be to provide notice to assailants.
A company could use a terms of service or user agreement to give notice
to anyone entering the company’s system that beacons could be deployed.123
Since intruders do not typically enter through normal channels, however, this
notice would have to be apparent at many levels of access.124 Scholars have
suggested that the use of warning banners could alleviate this issue, ensuring
that anyone entering the network from any point sees the warning at least
once.125 Courts typically view terms of service agreements as the parameter
for authorization to access a network, and therefore as long as the defender
does not exceed the access that it warned of, this action may be viewed as
legal under the CFAA.126
While a beacon would typically constitute unauthorized access under
§ 1030(a)(2), as it would enter the hacker’s computer without authorization
and obtain information,127 the violation would be at maximum proportional
to the hacker’s malfeasance. Because of this, the use of a beacon would be
viewed as acceptable under both criminal and tort self-defense doctrines,
should these doctrines be accepted in cyberspace as they are in the physical
world.
CONCLUSION
Companies are facing an ever-growing silent threat in the form of
hackers and data thieves. While it may seem prudent to allow law
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enforcement to track down and apprehend these criminals, the unfortunate
truth is that law enforcement does not have the capacity or the means to
tackle the well-hidden attackers who are regularly able to obtain consumer
data. Companies must be given the opportunity to work alongside the
authorities, using productive self-help measures, to protect their customers’
information and their own reputations. Beacons, satisfying the traditional
criteria of self-defense, would allow them to do just that. Additionally,
allowing defenders to use this tool would decrease their desire to launch
destructive counterattacks. Overall, the common use of beacons would
increase costs and accountability for hackers and therefore discourage
computer misuse crimes, improving the security of data stored in cyberspace
while presenting little risk to unwitting third parties.
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